Challenges and solutions for secure information centric networks: a case study of the NetInf architecture by Loo, Jonathan & Aiash, Mahdi
Middlesex University Research Repository
An open access repository of
Middlesex University research
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk
Loo, Jonathan and Aiash, Mahdi ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3984-6244 (2015)
Challenges and solutions for secure information centric networks: a case study of the NetInf
architecture. Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 50 . pp. 64-72. ISSN 1084-8045
(doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2014.06.003)
Final accepted version (with author’s formatting)
This version is available at: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/14016/
Copyright:
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically.
Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners
unless otherwise stated. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain
is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study
without prior permission and without charge.
Works, including theses and research projects, may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or
extensive quotations taken from them, or their content changed in any way, without first obtaining
permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). They may not be sold or exploited commercially in
any format or medium without the prior written permission of the copyright holder(s).
Full bibliographic details must be given when referring to, or quoting from full items including the
author’s name, the title of the work, publication details where relevant (place, publisher, date), pag-
ination, and for theses or dissertations the awarding institution, the degree type awarded, and the
date of the award.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the
Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:
eprints@mdx.ac.uk
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated.
See also repository copyright: re-use policy: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/policies.html#copy
Challenges and Solutions for Secure Information Centric
Networks: A Case Study of the NetInf Architecture
Jonathan Loo and Mahdi Aiash
School of Science and Technology
Middlesex University, UK
Abstract
A large number of emerging Internet applications requires information dissemi-
nation across different organizational boundaries, heterogeneous platforms, and
a large, dynamic population of publishers and subscribers. A new information-
centric network architecture called Network of Information (NetInf) has been
developed in the context of the FP7 EU-funded 4WARD project. This architec-
ture can significantly improve large scale information distribution. Furthermore,
it supports future mobile networks in situations with intermittent and hetero-
geneous connectivity and connects the digital with the physical world to enable
better user experience. However, NetInf is still in an early stage of implemen-
tation and its security is yet to be evaluated. The security concern of NetInf
is a major factor for its wide-scale adoption. Therefore, this paper uses the
X.805 security standard to analyse the security of the NetInf architecture. The
analysis highlights the main source of threats and suggests approaches to tackle
them. The paper also defines a threat model against the NetInf and proposes
corresponding security services.
Keywords: Network of Information, Information Centric Networks, X.805
standard
1. Introduction
Communication in the current Internet is based on the Client-Server model,
where servers share their resources and offer services to clients. In this model,
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communicating entities exchange the information among themselves. However,
new trends in communication systems place more attention on WHAT data5
are being exchanged rather than WHO are exchanging them [1] [2]. This led
to a new communication model, referred to as Information (or Data)-Centric
Networking (ICN). The principal paradigm in this model is not an end-to-end
communication between hosts. Instead, an increasing demand for highly scalable
and efficient distribution of content has motivated the development of architec-10
tures such as [3] [4] [5] [6] that focus on information objects, their properties,
and receiver interest in the network to achieve efficient and reliable distribution
of such objects [7].
The main reason for advocating the departure to the information-centric
model is that the current Internet is mostly used for content access and delivery,15
with a high volume of digital content delivered to users who are only interested
in the actual content rather than the source location [1]. In this sense, content
names are decoupled from hosts or servers addresses. So unlike current IP-based
addresses which use a single numbering system to identify hosts and define their
locations, the ICN separates the roles of identifier and locator, which implies20
that each data object will be identified, using a unique name called Named Data
Object (NDO) without being mapped to a specific location. This will lead to
one of the salient features of the ICN which is application-independent caching
of contents, where network elements like routers will be able to cache recent
contents and resend them when requested by other end-users, called requesters.25
Security considerations for ICNs differ somewhat from more typical host-
based networking scenarios. Broadly, it can be stated that content-security is
more interesting while less interest is needed in channel security, when compared
with host-based networking. Keeping this in mind, it is crucial to realize that
more traditional threats (e.g., snooping, Denial of Service and Impersonation30
attacks) still exist in ICN and hence current countermeasures may stay relevant.
However, many aspects of handling security in ICNs are only at an early stage
of development [8]. Research efforts in the area ICN security have been
mainly focusing on developing new generic mechanisms and security
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measures for ICNs without considering the differences between ICN35
architectures. Less research efforts considered providing security for
specific ICN architectures such as PSIRP and CCNx [? ] [5] , respec-
tively.
The NetInf architecture is one example of ICNs that has been
initially conceived in the FP7 project 4WARD [? ] and then has40
evolved further during the FP7 project SAIL. Despite the fact that
prototype implementations of the NetInf protocol and corresponding
applications have already been developed, security in NetInf is still
considered as an ”Open Issue” in the implementation documents [?
]. This is the main motivation for investigating the security-side of45
NetInf aiming at highlighting the main source of threats and sug-
gesting potential security services. However, there is a need for a
systematic approach to evaluate security in NetInf. Therefore, dif-
ferent standards have been considered in this paper such as the The
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) [? ],50
the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [? ]
and the X.805 standard of the ITU Telecommunication Standardiza-
tion Sector (ITU-T) [9].
The X.805 has been highly regarded as a comprehensive and generic
framework for assessing end-to-end security in different networking55
systems such as the 4G and IEEE 802.15.4 networks [? ] [? ] as well as
in emerging technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoTs), virtu-
alization and Cloud computing as in [? ] [? ]. Therefore, in this paper,
we focus on evaluating the security of NetInf in the light of the ITU-T
recommendation X.805 security architecture for end-to-end commu-60
nication. We identify and assess the security dimensions, planes and
layers in NetInf as defined in the X.805 framework. Based on the
analyses, we identify potential threats and attacks against the NetInf
and highlight possible security services to address them. It is worth
pointing out that the main contribution of this paper is to identify65
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the security threats and corresponding security services rather than
to propose solutions in terms of security mechanisms. The authors
acknowledge the need for more investigation and research to develop
security measures to address the highlighted security threats.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys a number70
of information centric architectures. More details about the NetInf architecture
and an overview of the X.805 standard are given in Section 3. The security
discussion based on the X.805 is given in Section 4. The paper concludes in
Section 5.
2. An Overview of Information Centric Network Architectures75
This section illustrates few of the most-known ICN approaches at a high
level with the purpose of providing a general understanding.
2.0.1. Data-Oriented Network Architecture (DONA)
The DONA relies on a new class of network entities called resolution handlers
(RHs). Name resolution is accomplished through the use of two basic functions:80
Register and Find [3]. As shown in Fig 1, initially, nodes that are authorized to
act as data sources send Register packets to register their NDOs with the local
RH. Each RH will maintain a registration table that maps a name to both a
next-hop RH and the distance to the copy (in terms of the number of RH hops,
or some other metric). When a client request a specific data (identified by a85
unique NDO), it sends a Find packet to the local RH, when a FIND arrives, the
forwarding rule is straightforward: if there is an entry in the registration table,
the FIND is sent to the next-hop RH (and if there is more than one, the choice
is based on the local policy and which entry is closest). Once a copy of the data
is found, it will be returned through the reverse RH path.90
2.0.2. Content-Centric Networking (CCN)
In CCN, NDOs are published at nodes, and routing protocols are used to
distribute information about the NDOs location. Communication is initiated by
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Figure 1: The Registration Stage (solid arrows). Routed Data (dashed arrows) [3]
Figure 2: The Request (solid arrows). Forwarded Data (dashed arrows)
issuing a request messages (referred to as Interest). An Interest is routed by a
data name instead of a host identifier. Because the data name has a hierarchical95
structure like a file system pathname such as /CCN.org/cnlab/ccnpaper’, each
CCN router can forward an Interest in a hop-by-hop manner [4]. A CCN router
maintains a pending interest table (PIT) for outstanding requests, this enables
request aggregation as a CCN router will not forward a second request for the
same NDO. Once a copy of the request data is found, it will be routed back on100
the reverse request path, as shown in Fig 2.
The CCNx protocol is an open source transport protocol for CCN
architecture. Through the implementation of CCNx, a number of
5
trust and security mechanisms have been proposed such as the mech-
anisms proposed in [? ] to uniquely identify users and devices re-105
questing and publishing contents in CCN architecture.
2.0.3. Publish-Subscribe Internet Routing Paradigm (RSIRP)
This approach is based on the concept of publish/Subscribe (Pub/Sub)
model, where hosts can join a network, publish data, and subscribe to pub-
lications. However, when a node publishes data, no data transfer actually takes110
place. Only when a node subscribes to a named piece of data, the network
finds the publication and creates a delivery path from the publisher to the sub-
scriber [5]. The network architecture is composed of three modules: Rendezvous
module which is a distributed database that maps the wanted data to the sub-
scriber. The Forwarding module, which is used to deliver data from one location115
to another, the forwarding procedure is based on label switching as each packet
will have a label that will help the router to decide on the next hop to forward
the packet. The Topology module creates and maintains delivery trees used for
forwarding traffic accomplished by the forwarding module. A node publishes
its NDOs to Rendezvous and when another node subscribes to this NDO, the120
publication and Subscription are matched by the Rendezvous module. If there
is a tree for the sub/pub, then data transfer starts straight away, otherwise the
forwarding module will forward data based on the labels of the packets.
2.0.4. The Green ICN
The Green ICN project [? ] does not propose a new ICN architecture, rather125
it optomize current ICN architecture in terms of energy consumption. The
project highlights the fact that current ICN proposals do not sufficiently address
energy efficiency, hence it investigates new methods for ICN architectures to
operate in a highly scalable and energy-efficient way. The GreenICN project
focuses mainly two exemplary application scenarios:130
• Disaster scenario: The focus here is to provide an efficient way to dis-
tribute disaster notification and critical rescue information after disasters
6
where energy and communication resources are at lost level.
• Video Scenario: Considering the increasing popularity of on-demand
Internet streaming media service such as Netflix and Youtube as well as the135
wide spread of smart mobile and tablet devices, the majority of Internet
traffic is going to be video streaming [? ]. Therefore, the GreenICN
project aims at providing scalable and efficient video delivery system both
in normal and disaster situations.
2.0.5. The Named Data Networking (NDN)140
Named Data Networking (NDN) is an ongoing research effort that aims to
move the Internet into the future with a content-centric design that is capable
of efficient content distribution and seamless mobility support, the project is
funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation under its Future Internet Ar-
chitecture Program [? ]. Communication and data retrieval in NDN is based145
on two types of packets namely, Interest and Data packets. Data objects are
identified using hierarchical addressing structure which also defines the location
of data objects. Similar to the DONA architecture, requesters request specific
data objects by sending Interest packets which holds the name of requested data
objects. Using the included name, Interest packets are forwarded towards data150
sources. Then, data objects will be routed back to requesters -in Data packets-
following the reverse path from the requester to the source [? ].
2.0.6. The Network of Information (NetInf) Architecture
NetInf is a networking approach that provides access to named data objects
(NDOs). Generally speaking NetInf architecture strives to achieve the follow-155
ing [8]
1. To enable access of named objects, and defines a naming scheme for these
objects. The NetInf naming scheme is designed to make objects accessible
not only via NetInf protocols, but also via other ICN protocols.
2. To perform routing and forwarding based on the NDOs.160
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3. The NDOs are independent of the location of the object in the network
topology.
4. To forward messages between end-points of the network. The message
includes a source and a destination identifier from the NetInf name space.
This is in analogy with the source and destination address in an IP packet.165
5. To support communications between multi-domain NetInf networks.
More details about the NetInf come in the following section.
A number of research papers have discussed the security of differ-
ent ICN networks in particular the PSIRP architecture as in [17].
The security of CCN architecture has also been investigated and anal-170
ysed as part of the CCNx project [? ]. To the best of our knowledge,
no such analysis of the security of NetInf has been introduced.
3. Related Work
3.1. The NetInf Architecture and Elements
On the most basic level, the NetInf network architecture can be viewed as175
having three distinct parts: publishers hosting and launching the data objects,
subscribers or requesters asking for data objects identified by NDOs, and the
NetInf’s routing/forwarding elements spanning over the inter-domain topology
along which payload data is delivered. The publishers advertise potential publi-
cations in the NetInf system and serve the data contents to the forwarding layer180
when it receives a new subscription via the routing layer. The NetInf system
acts as a middleman between publishers and subscribers, and is involved in con-
figuring the forwarding path for data delivery [8]. Three pairs of messages have
been defined as part of the NetInf architecture:
• The GET/GET-RESP messages: The GET message is used by a requester185
to request an NDO from the NetInf network. A node responding to the
GET message would send a GET-RESP that is linked to the GET request
using the message-Id (msg-id) from the GET message.
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Figure 3: The NetInf Message Flow. The Name Resolution mode (dashed Arrows). The
Name-Based Routing (solid Arrows)
• The PUBLISH/PUBLISH-RESP messages: The PUBLISH message al-
lows a publisher to push the name and a copy of the NDO to the network.190
A node receiving a PUBLISH message may choose to cache the NDO ac-
cording to local policy and availability of resources and returns PUBLISH-
RESP message, otherwise, it may choose to forward the message to other
nodes without sending the response message.
• The SEARCH/SEARCH-RESP messages: The SEARCH message allows195
the requester to send a set of query tokens containing search keywords.
The node that receives the SEARCH message, will either respond if the
NDO is in its own cache or forward the SEARCH message.
As shown in Fig 3,The NetInf combines two modes for retrieving NDOs:
1. The Name Resolution: In this mode, the publisher publishes an NDO200
using PUBLISH message with a Name Resolution Service (NRS). In this
case, a requester will approach the NRS first (using the GET message)
which will direct him to the information publisher.
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2. The Name-Based Routing: In this mode, the GET message will be for-
warded hop-by-hop between NetInf nodes until a cached copy of the re-205
quested NDO is found or the original publisher is reached.
3.2. Standards for Security Analysis
3.2.1. The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) is a Eu-
ropean Union (EU) agency dedicated to preventing and addressing network210
security and information security problems. ENISA publishes regular recom-
mendations for implementing and managing a wide spectrum of network and
information security technologies such as Cloud Computing, security for on-line
services and application [? ] [? ].
3.2.2. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)215
The ETSI issues standards that provide guidance and support for a com-
prehensive analysis of threats, vulnerabilities, risks and for the compilation of
a specific set of security requirements. Taking into consideration that the se-
curity architecture of a particular system is always unique and the threats and
security requirements are very specific to that system. The ETSI keeps on issu-220
ing standards for implementing individual technologies such as the Global Sys-
tem for Mobile Communications (GSM) [? ]. Despite the fact that the ETSI
has not yet proposed standards for ICN, some already existing standards for
managing and implementing security services in emerging technologies such as
Next-Generation-Networks (NGN) [? ] as well as guidelines for security policies225
in communication systems [? ] could be beneficial at the stage of implementing
security mechanisms in ICN.
3.2.3. The ITU-T X.805 Standard
Network security and reliability become a main concern for service providers,
network operators and users. In spite of the importance, threats to networking230
systems may happen in any layers such as services and infrastructure as well
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as any planes such as user and management. Because it is complex to analyze
security of networking systems, the The International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) developed the X.805 standard as a systematic analysis tool based on the
Bell Labs Security Model [3] [10]. By employing a modular approach, the X.805235
builds a structured framework that effectively drives consideration of all possible
threats and vulnerabilities for end-to-end network security. Moreover it provides
a comprehensive, multilayered, end-to-end network security framework across
eight security dimensions in order to combat network security threats.
Due to these reasons, the X.805 will be used in this paper to investigate the240
security threats in the NetInf architecture.
3.3. An overview of the X.805 architecture
As described in [9], the X.805 standard defines three security layers (applica-
tions, services and infrastructure), three security planes (end user, control and245
management) which are identified based on the activities performed over the
network, and also eight security dimensions to address general system vulnera-
bilities (Access Control, Authentication, Non-Reputation, Data Confidentiality,
Communication Security, Data Integrity, Availability, and Privacy). The con-
cept of security layers represents hierarchical approach to secure a network; it250
maps network equipment to different layers and shows how the network elements
in upper layers can rely on the security of the lower layers. Security planes rep-
resent the types of activities that occur on a network, the concept of security
planes could be instrumental for ensuring that essential network activities are
protected independently (e.g. compromise of security at the End-user Secu-255
rity Plane does not affect functions associated with the Management Security
Plane) [9]. Each security plane is applied to every security layer to yield nine
security perspectives and each security perspective has unique vulnerabilities
and threats. Figure 4 shows the complete architecture of the X.805 standard
including security layers, planes and dimensions.260
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Figure 4: The X805 Architecture
4. Security Evaluation of the NetInf
In this section we apply the X.805 standard to analyse the security of Net-
Inf. The security of NetInf could be discussed at two different levels namely,
application and infrastructure.
• The Application Level: It involves the data publishers and the sub-265
scribers domains, these might neither trust each other nor trust the NetInf
infrastructure.
• The Infrastructure Level: It consists of the NetInf network elements
that provides services such as routing, caching and forwarding to the ap-
plications. The infrastructure may not trust publishers and subscribers.270
Components of the infrastructure such as in-network caching entities may
not necessarily trust each other as well.
Considering the X.805 architecture in section 3.3, it is obvious that the func-
tionality of the NetInf is related to the Infrastructure Security Layer which is
concerned with the security of network links and elements, and the Applica-275
tion Security Layer which deals with the security of network-based applications
accessed by end-nodes. Below, we discuss the eight security dimensions in the
context of NetInf operation and try to relate them to the two security layers
when feasible:
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1. Access Control: A potentially major concern for the NetInf architecture280
is that it does not provide any inbuilt support for an authorization frame-
work or for access control. Once content has been published and cached
in the system by routers or end-points, not controlled by the publisher,
the publisher has no way to enforce access control, determine which users
have accessed the content or revoke its publication. In fact, in some cases,285
it is even difficult for the publishers themselves to perform access control,
where requests do not necessarily contain host/user identifier informa-
tion [10]. At the Infrastructure Layer, an inappropriate access control
policy allows an unauthorized node to access NDOs that were intended
for limited audience, not including the unauthorized node. While at the290
Application Layer, an unauthorized node might publish an object that is
intended to be returned to requesters instead of the correct object.
To address these challenges, access control mechanisms based on encrypt-
ing the content could be implemented, but the necessity of distributing
keys out-of-band appears to degrade the advantages of in-network caching.295
This also creates significant challenges when attempting to manage and
restrict key access. Another possible solution is by implementing autho-
rization and access control scheme such as the ones presented in [11] [12].
2. Authentication: For fully secure content distribution, content access
requires that the receiver needs to be able to reliably assess [10]300
• Data Validity: To make sure that the received NDOs are complete,
uncorrupted copies of what have originally been published;
• Data Provenance: To verify if the receiver can identify the pub-
lisher, and if so, whether it and the source of any cached version of
the NDO can be adequately trusted.305
• Data Relevance: To ensure that the received object fulfils the re-
quest that the receiver asked.
NetInf uses the Named Information (ni) URI scheme [13] to identify con-
tent. This allows NetInf to assure validity without any additional infor-
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mation but gives no assurance on provenance or relevance. A SEARCH310
request allows an application to identify relevant content, returned in the
SEARCH RESP message.
When operating in the Name Resolution mode, there is a need to achieve
an end-to-end authentication which, in this context, means that if sub-
scriber A receives a message claiming to have originated from publisher315
B, A can verify that B is indeed the publisher of the message. This level
of authentication is more relevant to the Application Security Layer of
the X.805. While point-to-point is another level of authentication that is
relevant to the Infrastructure Security Layer of X.805 and is applicable in
the Named-Based Routing operation mode. Point-to-point authentication320
is concerned only with the immediate end points of communications: if A
receives a message from B, A can verify that B is indeed the sender of the
message where A and B can be publishers, subscribers or network servers.
On one hand, point-to-point authentication could be achieved using cur-
rent mechanisms such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and digital sig-325
nature [14], where the publisher will digitally sign the data and the sig-
nature will be verified later on by the requester. The problem with such
approach is the need for a trusted third party for issuing the digital certifi-
cate and distributing the corresponding keys. End-to-end authentication,
on the other hand, requires the NetInf system to be trusted and resilient330
against a wide variety of threats such as impersonation and routers cache
poising. One potential solution is to use Naming Security (NS) services
which integrate security aspects and the naming concept by providing a
cryptographic strength binding between objects’ names and the the ob-
ject returned by the NetInf in response to a request. There are various335
mechanisms that may be used for this service such as using the Named
Information Uniform Resource Identifier (ni URI) [13] to identify content.
3. Non-repudiation: There is a need for monitoring and accounting the
system’s activities; publishers, requesters and NetInf nodes should be held
accountable for their actions. When considering the two security layers of340
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X.805, this dimension can be discussed as follows:
• The Application Security Layer: The importance of this dimension is
even more significant in commercial application of the NetInf archi-
tecture, where publishers charge requesters for the information they
provide. From the requester point of view, they need to make sure345
that publishers charge them fairly based on their access. While pub-
lishers need to audit requesters usage of the system. The nature of the
NetInf system, however, means there may be no direct relationship
between a publisher and requesters. Furthermore, a publisher has no
way of knowing which requesters receive (and should be charged for)350
particular datagrams.
One possible solution is to use an out-of-band solution based on the
concept of digital signature [15] where a publisher signs the data us-
ing its private key and bills subscribers by selling keys that decrypt
selected data. Another possible solution is based on the cellular busi-355
ness model [16], in this model both publishers and requesters need to
trust the NetInf system to account fairly, the NetInf infrastructure
can bill requesters according to the amount of information they re-
ceive and pay publishers according to the information they provide
without there being any direct relationship between publishers and360
requesters. The infrastructure would keep track of who received what
NDOs at what frequency and who publishes them. Periodically the
system would bill the subscribers and send a portion of the payment
to the appropriate publishers [17]. Obviously, this solution requires
extending the capabilities of the NetInf system to keep track and365
monitors the system utilization. Furthermore, such system should
be scalable to a global scale.
• The Infrastructure Security Layer: At this layer, non-repudiation
mechanisms are concerned with assuring that system nodes such as
NetInf routers adhere to security rules and are held accountable on370
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their activities. This means that there is a need for identifying in-
dividual nodes at the network-level. One possible solution is the
Packet Level Authentication (PLA) protocol [18]. The PLA is based
on the assumption that per packet public key cryptographic opera-
tions are possible at wire speed in high speed networks due to new375
cryptographic algorithms and advances in semiconductor technology.
It has been used in [19] to provide availability, accountability and to
protect the network infrastructure of the PSIRP architecture.
4. Data Confidentiality: This security dimension is relevant to both secu-
rity layers.380
• The Application Security Layer: At this layer, data confidentiality
mechanisms are needed to maintain publication confidentiality; can
publishers control which subscribers may receive particular publica-
tions? [17]. Publication confidentiality might not be relevant in open
applications where publishers offers their information and data to385
everyone. In such applications publishers do not know and perhaps
do not care to know the identity of the requesters who receive their
information. In other applications, however, it is important that pub-
lications be kept secret from ones who are not legitimate subscribers.
One possible solution to maintain publication confidentiality is to use390
one of the group key distribution mechanisms such as [20] [21] [22],
where the publisher will pre-distribute keys with all potential re-
questers. Obviously, this is an out-of-band approach that requires
pre-arrangements between the publishers and subscribers.
• The Infrastructure Security Layer: Data confidentiality at this layer395
is mainly concerned of preventing data from being exposed while on
transit. Keeping in mind the name-based routing operational mode
of NetInf, one major issue here is whether publishers and requester
should trust the NetInf infrastructure to perform routing without
exposing data contents. The severity of this issue increases dramati-400
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cally when considering the fact that information may travel through
network segments that are not necessarily trusted. Enhanced ver-
sions of event-notification services such as Siena or Yeast [23] [24]
could be deployed. In the Siena system the publications travel along
the shortest path from the publisher to the subscribers. Because of405
the way the routing mechanism works, a network node in Siena only
knows its immediate predecessor and successor in the path. End-
point anonymity is preserved in any path that has more than two
hops.
5. Communication Security: Point-to-Point model is the predominant410
communication model of current host-centric networks such as the Inter-
net. In this model, users need to approach a defined end-point (using
the IP address and port number) to access resources; therefore, secu-
rity is mainly achieved by securing the communication channels between
the two end-points, largely via Secure Socket Layer (SSL)/TLS or IPsec415
VPNs [25] [26]. Unfortunately, such mechanisms will not be as efficient in
ICNs: firstly, the concept of point-to-point is different in ICN; requesters
request data objects or NDOs without really being aware of their actual
location. Secondly, requesters might get chunks of data from different
sources none of which might be the publisher, setting up a secure connec-420
tion with each potential source will be a very time consuming and exhaus-
tive process. Therefore, there is a need to move from connection-oriented
into information-oriented design of security mechanisms.
6. Data Integrity: This dimension is relevant to both security layers:
• The Application Security Layer: At this layer the term data integrity425
involves information integrity, authenticity and validity. Integrity
protection methods will ensure that any violation or fabrication of
information elements’ content will be detectable. Authenticity means
that the information that is received by the subscriber is identical
with the subscriber’s initial request, and it is not forged. Validity430
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means that the information items announced by the publisher and
then forwarded to the subscriber are identical and match the sub-
scriber’s request [27].
• The Infrastructure Security Layer: In this layer, concept of integrity
refers mainly to system integrity [17]; the Integrity of the NetInf435
system can be put at risk if malicious faults arise at the infrastruc-
ture level (e.g., infrastructure hosts are compromised). A malicious
server can insert bogus subscriptions and act as a bogus subscriber to
neighbouring servers. Moreover, it can ignore the routing algorithm
entirely and route messages to arbitrary destinations or drop them440
completely.
7. Availability: Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks may require more effort on
ICN than on TCP/IP but they are still feasible. One reason for this is
that it is difficult for the attacker to force repeated requests for the same
content onto a single node; ICNs naturally spread content so that after445
the initial few requests, subsequent requests will generally be satisfied by
alternative sources, blunting the impact of a DoS attack [10]. In addition
to the standard infrastructure attacks to which all distributed applications
are vulnerable, NetInf systems open up some new classes of attacks which
are relevant to both security layers.450
• The Application Security Layer: malicious publications and subscrip-
tions can be used to overload the system; subscribers flood publishers
with bogus subscription messages
• The Infrastructure Security Layer: DoS attacks might target the
caching and routing plane of the NetInf; attackers might generate455
loads of unwanted traffic like SPAM which will be cached by inter-
mediate nodes, hence overloading the caching plane and leading to
cache overflow. Alternatively, an attacker pollutes the content of a
cache, resulting in incorrect returned objects, possibly as a denial
of service [8]. The end result is that the efficiency of caches can be460
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decreased by attackers with the goal of DoS.
To tackle these issues, the NetInf infrastructure needs to make sure that
no data should be delivered unless there is a valid subscription from the
subscriber. Prevention of unwanted traffic will improve availability, since
all parties will be able to serve valid users.465
8. Privacy: Privacy is a main area where the ICN architectures have not
been significantly analyzed [10]. Caching implies a trade-off between net-
work efficiency and privacy. The activity of users is significantly more
exposed to the scrutiny of cache owners with whom they may not have
any relationship. Although in many ICN architectures, the source of a470
request is not explicitly identified, an attacker may be able to obtain con-
siderable information if s/he can monitor transactions on the cache and
obtain details of the objects accessed, the topological direction of requests
and information about the timing of transactions. The persistence of data
in the cache can make life easier for an attacker by giving a longer timescale475
for analysis.
The privacy issue is relevant to both security layers:
• The Application Security Layer: The main issue at this layer is the
privacy of subscription information; can requesters obtain their re-
quested NDOs without revealing their subscription information and480
credentials to the publishers or infrastructure?. One possible solution
is the Private Information Retrieval mechanisms [28] [29] and secure
circuit evaluation mechanisms [30] [17] which enable users to retrieve
database entries without disclosing the entries.
• The Infrastructure Security Layer: At this layer the main concern485
is exposing the cached information, content can be extracted by any
attacker connected to the cache, putting users’ privacy at risk.
4.1. Threat Model and Security Requirements
The analysis in Section 4 highlights new threats in ICNs generally and in
the NetInf architecture in particular. In this section we will use the analysis490
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results to define a threat model against the NetInf architecture. Similarly to the
analysis approach, the threat models will highlights possible attack scenarios at
both the Application and Infrastructure security layers.
1. The Application Security Layer:
• False Content Injection (FC) is where a unauthenticated publishes495
an object that is intended to be returned to requesters instead of
the correct object. This is analogous to actions taken by companies
working on behalf of copyright owners in publishing ”bad” versions
of music, that may contain a warning or advertisement for a legal
equivalent of the intended object [8].500
• Privacy Invasion (PI): A malicious or a compromised publisher will
leak subscription information.
• Unauthorized Access (UA): is where an unauthorized node accesses
an object that was intended for a limited audience, not including that
node.505
• False Accusation (FA): is where a malicious publisher attempts to
make it appears as if a requester has requested an object , when that
is not in fact the case. For example, the malicious publisher might
charge a subscriber for information s/he never requested or acquired.
2. The Infrastructure Security Layer:510
• Unauthorized Cache Access (UCA): is where an unauthorized node
accesses a cached object from a local router.
• Privacy Invasion (PI): The SEARCH message of NetInf architecture
enables routers and nodes to check the cache contents of other nodes.
In the case of edge routers, knowing this information will enable an515
active attacker to get an idea about the sort of activities, local nodes
or requesters are doing. More seriously, an attacker might be able to
predict the next NDO to be fetched.
• Cache Misuse (CM): Caches could be misused in the following ways:
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Table 1: Threat Model defines potential attacks at two layers
(a) Attackers can use caches as storage to make their own content520
available.
(b) Attackers pollutes the content of a cache, resulting in incorrect
returned objects, possibly as a denial of service.
• Routing Misuse (RM): Attackers might compromise a router and
modify the routing plane so that transactions are routed in a way525
beneficial to the bad-actor, but detrimental to some other legitimate
subscribers. Furthermore, attackers might direct all traffic to a com-
promised publisher where provided NDOs have malicious codes such
as malware or trojan horses.
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Security Layer Attacks Security Services
Application Layer False Content Injection
Data Origin Authentication Services
Content Authentication Services
Authorization Services
Unauthorized Access Out-of-band PKI
False Accusation Distributed auditing systems
Infrastructure Security Layer
Unauthorized Access to cached data Zoning techniques
Cache Misuse Data Provenance services
Routing Misuse Trusted Computing
Application and Infrastructure Layers Privacy Invasion Privacy preserving Services
4.2. Security Services
In order to tackle the threats highlighted in the above threat model, this
section will describe potential security services and mechanisms that could be
integrated with the NetInf architecture.535
1. False Content Injection (FC): For successful FC, an attacker needs to by-
pass the authentication, authorization and access control mechanisms and
being able to impersonate a legitimate publisher. Therefore, to mitigate
this threat, there is a need for a combination of security services:
• Data Origin Authentication (OA): This service enable requesters to540
verify that data has been generated and published by expected pub-
lisher. Example of such service is the digital signature algorithm to
provide ”proof of origin”, and also allowing sensitive message con-
tents to be protected from tampering as will be discussed later on.
• Content Authentication (CA): This service aims to verify that the545
data or NDO is genuine and real; not counterfeit or copied. Such
service could be achieved by including extra information in the meta-
data of the NDO that verify the publisher, time of publication, copy
or original, etc. It is crucial however, to maintain meta-data integrity.
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• Authorization (AZ): It refers to the general ability of an entity to550
control which other entities are supposed to be able to gain access to
an object. Different approaches could be used to enforce this service
such as centralized authorization and access control mechanisms such
as RADIUS and DIAMETER [31] [32] or distributed authorization
mechanisms such as the one in [33]555
2. Privacy Invasion (PI): As described in the Threat Model, the PI is possi-
ble at the Application and Infrastructure levels. Privacy preserving mech-
anisms such as onion-routing (the TOR for example [34])or other obfusca-
tory routing schemes may provide a certain level of privacy. Furthermore,
the fact that in-network stores return objects may also act so as to make560
tracking user actions more difficult. However, the fact that in-network
stores cost money will likely result in their operators being willing to
share information, including tracking information, with third parties.
3. Unauthorized Access (UA): As explained in section 4, an out-of-band ap-
proach, based on the PKI could be used to share keys between the pub-565
lisher and the potential requesters. Only requesters with the valid corre-
sponding keys will be able to get the data.
4. False Accusation (FA): In order to address this threat, there is a need
for an efficient auditing system that logs all activities, distributed audit
service such as XDAS [35] could be used for this reason.570
5. Unauthorized Access to cached data (UAC): Due to the feature of in-
network store/cache of the ICNs, attackers might get access to data cached
in local routers. One possible solution for this threat is by using the Scope
concept [19]. Scopes are abstract entities that control how publications
are disseminated. The scope authorizes one or more data sources such as575
routers to host/cache the publication data or NDOs.
6. Cache Misuse (CM): To mitigate this threat, evidence gathering mecha-
nisms would be required, along with cryprographic and time based mecha-
nisms in order to provide a data Provenance service and making sure that
23
data has been cached by an expected router.580
7. Routing Misuse (RM): This threats highlights the issue of the trustwor-
thiness and integrity of the NetInf infrastructure. One possible solution is
based on the concept of Trusted Computing [36]. Trusted computing is an
approach to build systems such that their integrity can be verified. It is
based on the concept of transitive trust where initial trust in a hardware585
module is delegated to other system components. The industry standard
trusted hardware module is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [37].
5. Conclusion
NetInf is an information-centric communication paradigm that supports dy-
namic, many-to-many communications in a distributed environment. In such590
an environment, publishers publish information in the form of events and sub-
scribers have the ability to express their interests in an event or a pattern of
events by sending subscription filter to the NetInf network. Despite the fact
that some desired security features have been provided in NetInf using the a
newly developed naming scheme, there is still a need for a thorough security595
analysis to highlight any potential threat. Therefore, the paper investigates the
security issue of the NetInf architecture using the X.805 standard. Eight secu-
rity threats have been analysed and discussed in that context. The paper also
discusses a number of proposals to secure NetInf. The discussion highlights the
fact that different proposals have addressed different security threats; however,600
no integrated approach has been proposed to address all of them. Therefore, our
future work is to develop a comprehensive security framework that addresses
the highlighted security threats in this paper.
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